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Laws of Nature and Explanatory Circularity 
 
Abstract 
Some recent literature (Hicks, Michael Townsen, and Peter van Elswyk, Philosophical 
Studies 172 (2): 433–443, 2015; Bhogal, Harjit, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 
(3): 447–460, 2017) has argued that the non-Humean conceptions of laws of nature 
have a same weakness as the Humean conceptions of laws of nature. That is, both 
conceptions face an explanatory circularity problem. The argument is as follows: the 
Humean and the non-Humean conceptions of laws of nature agree that the law 
statements are universal generalisations; thus, both conceptions are vulnerable to an 
explanatory circularity problem between the laws of nature and their instances. In this 
paper, I argue that Armstrong’s necessitarian view of laws of nature is invulnerable to 
this explanatory circularity problem. 
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1. Introduction 
Some recent literature (Bhogal 2017; Hicks and Elswyk 2015) has argued that the non-
Humean conceptions of laws of nature have a same weakness as the Humean 
conceptions of laws of nature: both conceptions face an explanatory circularity problem. 
Briefly, it is argued that the Humean and the non-Humean conceptions of laws of nature 
agree that the law statements are universal generalisations. Thus, both conceptions are 




I begin this paper by distinguishing two explanatory circularity problems: 1) a 
full circularity problem and 2) a self-explanation circularity problem. I argue that 
Armstrong’s necessitarian view of laws of nature – a non-Humean conception – is 
invulnerable to these explanatory circularity problems. Finally, I analyse a circular 
condition for unsuccessful explanations, recently proposed by Shumener (n.d.).  
 
2. Two explanatory circularity problems 
In the literature, the terminology “explanatory circularity problem” has been used to 
designate two slightly different circularities. A first circularity is a full explanatory 
circularity (hereafter, the problem of circularity C). Synthetically, a law of nature is 
inferred from an observed phenomenon and, thereafter, it is used to explain that same 
observed phenomena. Thus, an observed phenomenon explains itself. The other 
circularity is a problem of self-explanation (hereafter, the problem of circularity SE). A 
law of nature explains an observed phenomenon, but the law includes that same 
phenomenon in its content.1 
In terms of laws of nature, the problem of circularity C is articulated by an 
argument along with a transitivity principle: 
 
(1) Observed FGs explain Law L.  
(2) Law L explains observed FGs.  
(3) If observed FGs explain Law L and Law L explains observed FGs, then 
observed FGs explain observed FGs. [transitivity principle]  
() Observed FGs explain observed FGs. 
 





The problem of circularity SE is a sub-problem of the problem of circularity C. 
 
(1) Law L is a generalisation of the form “all Fs are Gs”. 
(2)  Law L explains observed FGs.  
() Observed FGs explain observed FGs. 
 
The transitivity principle is the main difference between these problems. The transitivity 
principle is not required to articulate the problem of circularity SE. This is an important 
difference because the transitivity principle is problematic. For example, the transitivity 
principle encapsulates the “big” problem of induction and the reference problem of the 
term “explanation”. The first problem is on the justification of the transition between 
observed FGs to unobserved FGs. Basically, in the problem of induction there is a 
bottom-up step from observed FGs to the law statement; and then there is a top-down 
step from the law statement to the observed (and unobserved) FGs. The transitivity 
principle connects these two steps. The second problem is on the correct reference of 
the term “explanation” in the transitivity principle. For example, Loewer (2012) argues 
for two references of the term: on the one hand, the Humean mosaic (i.e. “the 
distribution of fundamental categorical properties/quantities and relations instantiated 
by fundamental entities (particles, fields etc.) throughout all of space–time” (Loewer 
2012, p. 116)) metaphysically explains the laws; on the other, the laws scientifically 
explain the Humean mosaic.2 In light of the structure of the problem of circularity SE, 
these two difficult problems can simply be bypassed. 
 
2 In the literature there is a huge discussion around the transitivity principle. For example, see Lange 




3. A necessitarian reply to the problem of circularity C 
Hicks and Elswyk (2015) propose the following argument for the problem of circularity 
C. 
 
(P1) The natural laws [law statements] are generalizations. (HUMEANISM) 




(P3) The natural laws [law statements] explain their instances. (LAWS) 
(P4) If A (partially) explains B and B (partially) explains C, then A (partially) explains C. 
(TRANSITIVITY) 
(C1) The natural laws [law statements] are (partially) explained by their positive instances. 
(P1 & P2) 
(C2) The instances of laws [law statements] explain themselves. (P3, P4, & C1) (Hicks and 
Elswyk 2015, p. 435)4 
 
This argument falls on the side of the problem of explanatory circularity C, where the 
transitivity principle is invoked. They claim that this argument also applies to the non-
Humean conceptions of laws of nature: 
 
Humeans and anti-Humeans should agree that law statements are universal generalizations (…) 
If we’re right about this much, anti-Humeans are vulnerable to a tu quoque. When laws are 
statements taking the form of universal generalizations, even if the statements are rendered laws 
by something else (e.g. essential natures, relations to other laws), the statements are made true by 
 
3 Bhogal (2017, p. 448) also defends this premise. Erroneously, he claims that “Armstrong and Maudlin 
suggest that instances explain universal generalizations”.  
4 In what follows, I use the term “law statements” to refer to the natural laws, as the first term is more 
usual in the literature. (See also the passage below of Hicks and Elswyk (2015, p. 435)) 
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instances of whatever the law is about. It is here that the specter of circularity appears. How can 
a law explain its instances if it is also made true by those instances? (Hicks and Elswyk 2015, p. 
435 my italics) 
 
Bhogal (2017) seems to argue in the same vein: 
 
[The problem of explanatory circularity] applies just as well to non-Humean accounts that say 
that laws are generalizations. Take, for example, a view saying that laws are generalizations but 
what makes those particular generalizations laws is the existence of certain primitive nomic 
entities. This is clearly an anti-Humean view—there are facts about the laws that are not 
reducible to (nor do they supervene on) the occurrent facts—but it does face this problem. 
(Bhogal 2017, p. 448) 
   
Armstrong’s view of laws of nature is one of the targets of the above passages, as this is 
a non-Humean conception. Armstrong defend the view that laws of nature govern the 
events. They confer order upon the observable world. They are additional entities above 
the regularities of the Humean mosaic. However, considering Armstrong’s view, the 
premises (P2) and (P3) of the above argument are false.  
Let us begin by premise (P2). Armstrong claims that the laws of nature are states 
of affairs. A second-order relation, called N, binds first-order universals F and G (i.e. 
N(F,G)). The law of nature, N(F,G), entails and explains the regularity, “all Fs are Gs” 
(Armstrong 1983, p. 41, 1988, p. 225, 1993, p. 422). “All Fs are Gs” is not a law of 
nature. The generalisation “all Fs are Gs” is a law statement. For example, the law 
statement “all ravens are black” is entailed and explained by the law N(F,G), where F is 
the universal ravenhood and G is the universal blackness. A particular raven a is black 
because it instantiates the universals ravenhood and blackness and these universals are 
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necessary related by N. In sum, (P2) is false because the truthmakers of the law 
statements are (metaphysical) laws of nature (Armstrong 1991, p. 507).  
It might be objected that my reply misconstrues the argument of Hicks and 
Elswyk. Even if the laws of nature explain the law statements, it does not follow that the 
truth of generalisations of the law statements is not (partially) explained by their 
positive instances. The argument is as follows. The positive instances of the laws of 
nature explain the laws of nature. The laws of nature explain the law statements. Thus, 
by transitivity, the positive instances of the laws of nature explain the truth of the 
generalisations of the law statements. Given that, for a necessitarian, any positive 
instance of a law of nature implies a positive instance of the correspondingly law 
statement, then the truth of generalisations of the law statements is (partially) explained 
by their positive instances. That is, (P2) is true. 
The controversial premise of the above objection is this one: the positive 
instances of the laws of nature explain the laws of nature. As far as I can see, this 
premise is supported by the following ideas. Armstrong’s metaphysics is committed to 
an Aristotelian immanent realist general theory of universals. That is, universals exist 
only in their instances. Given that the laws of nature are universals, then there are not 
actual uninstantiated laws of nature. Every law of nature must have at least one instance. 
Laws are somewhat Humean supervenient on their instances and, thus, instances of the 
laws may explain the laws of nature.  
First, not every necessitarian on laws must undertake an Aristotelian immanent 
realist general theory of universals. For example, Tooley (1977) accepts a Platonic 
realism about universals. Precisely, he accepts that it is logically possible for there to 
exist uninstantiated universals. Thus, there is room for actual uninstantiated laws. 
However, if uninstantiated laws of nature are logically possible, then actual 
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uninstantiated laws of nature cannot be explained by inexistent instances. A 
necessitarian does not need a full adoption of Armstrong’s metaphysics to reply to the 
circularity problem. Tooley’s actual uninstantiated laws refute the claim that positive 
instances of the laws of nature explain the laws of nature. 
Second, even within an Aristotelian immanent realist general theory of 
universals, there is room for uninstantiated laws of nature. However, in this case, 
uninstantiated laws of nature are based on counterfactual laws. These laws are higher-
order laws. Let us suppose that instances of the universal F do not exist. According to 
immanent realism, then the universal F does not exist. However, let us suppose that 
there is some empirical evidence that suggests that it is a law of nature that Fs are Gs. 
Then, he can assert the counterfactual law: if there were Fs, then it would be a law of 
nature that N(F,G) (Armstrong 1983, Chapter 8). It seems to me that these actual 
counterfactual laws may challenge the claim that positive instances of the laws of nature 
explain the laws of nature.  
Third, for a necessitarian, if the positive instances of the laws of nature explained 
the laws of nature, then the laws of nature would not explain their instances. Mumford 
speculates about this: 
 
[T]he instances to an extent determine the laws, rather than vice versa, and this is a surprising 
situation for a supposedly realist account of laws. It might be wondered, therefore, whether laws 
explain their instances as the singular causal transactions appear primary. Is it the case, therefore, 
that the instances instead explain the laws? If laws do not explain their instances, in what sense is 
the DTA theory a theory of nomological realism? (Mumford 2004, p. 93) 
 
If the positive instances of the laws of nature explained the laws of nature, the laws of 
nature would be incapable of any external and governing role. However, for a 
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necessitarian, it is a sort of first philosophical principle that the laws of nature do have a 
governing role concerning the regularities in space-time. Thus, by modus tollens, it is 
not true that the positive instances of the laws of nature explain the laws of nature.   
Now, premise (P3). The Humean claims that the law statements explain the 
observed instances. Then, the Humean faces the following necessitarian argument.  
 
(1) The laws of nature explain the law statements. [necessitarian conditional]  
(2) The law statements explain their instances. [(P3) of Hicks and Elswyk] 
(3) The instances of the law statements are also instances of the correspondingly 
laws of nature. 
(4) The law statements explain the instances of the correspondingly laws of 
nature. [(2) and (3)] 
(5) If A explains B and B explains C, then A explains C. [transitivity] 
() The laws of nature explain the instances of these laws. [(1), (4) and (5)] 
 
This is a valid argument, where, for the Humean, the conclusion is false. Instead, the 
law statements explain their instances. Thus, one of the premises of the argument is 
false. Premise (1) is a necessitarian conditional that Hicks and Elswyk do not question 
in the support of their argument (see the above passage, i.e., “the statements are 
rendered laws by something else”). I am assuming that there is a law of nature for the 
correspondingly law statement, thus, premise (3) is a metaphysical consequence of 
premise (1). Finally, premises (2) and (5) are also premises of the above argument of 
Hicks and Elswyk. In this paper, I am not questioning transitivity (5). We are left with 
premise (2). Accordingly, premise (2) is false. It is not true that “the law statements 
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explain their instances”. This is the premise (P3) of the original argument of Hicks and 
Elswyk. 
 The Humean wants to bring into the discussion the necessitarian conception of 
laws of nature. For that reason, he must buy some of the metaphysical necessitarian 
package, namely, the claim that the laws of nature entail and explain the law statements 
(premise 1). It does not seem that premise (1) can be a sort of Humean gambit move. To 
assume that the laws of nature explain the law statements implies that the law 
statements cannot explain their instances, whereas from a necessitarian point of view, 
this is correct. Behind the law statements there are laws of nature. These laws of nature 
are the entities responsible for the explanatory role. For a necessitarian, the law 
statement “all Fs are Gs” does not explain the instances of the law statement. It is the 
universal N(F,G) that explains the instances of the law statement. 
 
4. A necessitarian reply to the problem of circularity SE 
Given that the problem of circularity SE is a sub-problem of the circularity C, the 
replies above may only be applied to the problem of circularity C. That is, the replies 
above may uncross the problem of circularity SE. However, this is not the case. The 
replies above on premise (P3) are also applicable to the problem of circularity SE.  
As far as I can see, if we try to reframe the above argument of Hicks and Elswyk 
to underpin the problem of circularity SE, we obtain the following argument:  
 
(P1) The law statements are generalizations. (HUMEANISM) 
(P2)*  If the law statements are generalizations, then the law statements are 
(partially) constituted by their instances. 
(P3) The law statements explain their instances. (LAWS) 
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(C2) The instances of the law statements explain themselves.  
 
Considering what I said above, premise (P3) is false. It is N(F,G) that explain the 
instances of the law statements. The problem of circularity SE does not threaten the 
necessitarian.  
 
5. Shumener’s circularity condition 
Shumener (n.d.) proposes a problem of semantic circularity. She argues that the DN 
model of scientific explanation illustrates this problem. The DN model of scientific 
explanation proposes that the structure of scientific explanation is deductive, where the 
explanans comprises law statements and initial/antecedent conditions. The 
explanandum is derived from the explanans by means of logic deductive rules. In light 
of the DN model, the law statements are generalisation statements. Thus, it follows that 
the explanandum is included in the explanans. The problem of semantic circularity 
reframes the problem of circularity SE as follows: 
 
Argument 1 
Explanans (1) All Fs are Gs. [law statement] 
(2) a is F. [antecedent condition] 
Explanandum: a is G. 
 
Given that “a is G” is included in the first premise, “all Fs are Gs”, it follows that “a is 
G” is used to explain “a is G”. Synthetically, “a is G” (partially) explains “a is G”.  





CON: If the content of a sentence E is part of the content of a set of sentences, , then an 




Shumener claims that the problem of semantic circularity does not apply to a 
necessitarian view of laws of nature:  
 
An anti-Humean who takes laws to be necessitation relations between universals will be able to 
avoid the circularity charge as well. Let’s consider the explanation of ‘Ga’ by ‘Fa’ and the law 
‘all Fs are Gs’. Here, the anti-Humean can claim that it is the sentence ‘F-ness necessitates G-
ness’ or ‘N(F, G)’, conjoined with ‘Fa’ will explain ‘Ga’. The verifier for ‘N(F, G)’ will involve 
universals standing in a higher-order relation to one another, and the state [Ga] need not be 
involved. (Shumener n.d., p. 19) 
 
Basically, Shumener proposes the following explanatory structure: 
 
Argument 2 




Shumener’s answer is correct at its core. As I argued before, for a necessitarian, the law 
statement “all Fs are Gs” does not explain Ga. It is the universal N(F,G) that explains 
Ga. However, there are some problems in the condition CON.  
 
5 I corrected a typo. The first “” is missing in the original paper. 
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First, the circularity condition CON simply points to a larger circularity problem 
of most deductive arguments: the conclusions of most deductive arguments are part of 
the content of one of the premises of the argument. She insists, however, that in some 
arguments the conclusion may be validly deduced from premises but the conclusion is 
not part of the premises of the argument. She advances the following example: 
 
‘George is in the philosophy department’ does not have ‘It is raining or it is not raining’ as part of its 
content, for example, even though the latter is a logical consequence of the former. (Shumener n.d., 
sec. 4.1) 
 
The conclusion of the above example is an instance of the tertium non datur. It is a 
logical truth. However, the conclusions of our explanations, inferred from laws of 
nature, are not logical truths. Rhetorically, what is the point of trying to explain logical 
truths by means of laws of nature?  
Second, and contrary to Shumener, the explanatory structure of argument 2 
violates the circularity condition CON. An instance of the law, N (F, G), is given by 
Rab, where R = N(F,G), a = a’s being F and b = a’s being G, that is: (N(F,G)) (a’s 
being F, a’s being G) (Armstrong 1983, p. 90). The explanandum, Ga, continues to be 
part of the explanans.6 This is not surprising. The fact that observed FGs instantiate a 
law of nature means that observed FGs are member of a class of types, where all Fs are 
necessarily connected with Gs. Thus, in light of CON, argument 2 is circular. If CON 
were true, that would good news for the Humean. The necessitarian view of laws of 
nature would succumb to a semantic circular problem.  
 
6 In light of Armstrong’s view, argument 2 does not seem to be explanatory. For him “explanation is more 




The root of this misunderstanding is the condition CON. A semantic condition 
cannot be used to assess metaphysical explanations. “All Fs are Gs” is exhausted by “all 
observed Fs are Gs” and “all unobserved Fs are Gs”. However, N (F, G) is not 
metaphysically exhausted by “all Fs are Gs”. The premise N (F, G) is what 
differentiates the argument 1 from the argument 2. N (F, G) is the tertium quid which 
mediates the observed and the unobserved. This is a new postulated entity – a strong 
law. It unifies the regularities. Without this strong law no explanation in terms of laws 
of nature is successful. 
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